Category: Finance

Banking, Canada, Finance, Inflation

Why we can’t just ‘stop printing money’ to get inflation down

Jacqueline Best
https://images.theconversation.com/files/457998/original/file-20220413-26-h1sbqm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C343%2C6352%2C3176&q=45&auto=format&w=1356&h=668&fit=crop

With the Bank of Canada announcing an oversized interest rate hike this week, it might seem like central banks are coming to rescue us from inflation once again. Yet while they did play an important role in mitigating a COVID-induced recession, central banks don’t have the power to solve our inflation problem.

There’s no question that the inflation outlook today is worrying. With inflation hitting 5.7 per cent in March, we are facing a perfect storm of inflationary pressures from a combination of supply chain bottlenecks, pent-up demand and massive increases in energy prices from Russian sanctions.

As politicians start to make noise about inflation, we need to be careful not to accept the outdated assumption that central banks can control inflation by limiting the money supply.

Conservative Party leadership hopeful Pierre Poilievre recently asserted that the solution to inflation is to “stop the central bank from printing money to pay for government spending.” This is not only factually incorrect (the Bank of Canada stopped purchasing large amounts of government bonds back in October of last year), but also outdated.

The legacy of monetarism

Back in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher capitalized on public anxiety around rising prices by bringing their conservative governments into power on the promise of getting tough on inflation using monetarism.

We should not be too surprised, then, to see the legacy of this outdated economic policy living on in members of the Conservative Party of Canada.

Poilievre has resurrected the age-old theory — let’s call it quack monetarism — that inflation is caused by too much money circulating in the economy and that the solution is to reduce the central bank’s money creation. Inflation has never only been about money; central banks can’t just wave a magic wand and get it down again.

The limits of monetary policy

While central banks do play an important part in getting inflation under control by setting interest rates, they don’t have all the tools needed to get inflation down this time around — particularly when some of the dynamics driving price increases will not respond to changes in interest rates.

As writer Adam Tooze points out, monetary policy can’t improve bottlenecks in the supply of microchips — which are driving car prices higher — or increase the supply of gas.

Even when monetary policy is effective in getting inflation down, there is always the risk of the central bank overshooting its aims and pushing the economy into a recession — as a growing number of policymakers worry may happen today.

Quack monetarism

So why do conservative politicians like Poilievre want us to believe we can solve this problem by getting the central bank to stop printing money? This is the kind of “zombie idea” that won’t die, in spite of being proven wrong, because its simplicity is so politically appealing.

This claim harks back to Milton Friedman’s famous dictum that inflation is “always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.” The monetarist theory that Friedman advocated and which became very influential in the 1970s and early 1980s assumed the solution to inflation was to limit the expansion of the money supply.

What’s wrong with this idea? American banker Henry Wallich famously responded to Friedman’s statement by replying, “inflation is a monetary phenomenon in the same way that shooting someone is a ballistic phenomenon.” In other words, an excess of money may be partly to blame for inflation, but if you want to truly solve it, you need to understand the underlying causes of the problem.

As political economist Matthew Watson has shown, economists keep changing their minds about the broader causes of inflation: shifting from pointing a finger at international balance of payments shocks in the 1960s to the oil crisis in the 1970s, the “wage-push” inflation in the 1980s, governments’ lack of anti-inflation credibility in the 1990s and finally the problem of unanchored inflation expectations in the past few decades.

Even if today’s inflation had similar causes to the 1970s, we don’t want to try monetarism again. Central banks in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom all tried it in the late 1970s. By 1982 they had given up on it because monetarism simply did not work.

Most money is actually created by private banks and so attempts by the central bank to limit the money supply are doomed to failure. The bank can influence the demand for money by increasing or decreasing interest rates, but does not control the money supply itself.

Monetary policy is a blunt instrument

What finally did get inflation down in the 1980s was a combination of punishingly high interest rates — over 21 per cent in Canada — and the most painful recession since the Great Depression, with unemployment rising to 12.8 per cent in Canada. This is not an experience that we want to repeat.

If the economic trauma of 1970s and 1980s teaches us anything, it’s that monetary policy can be a very blunt instrument. To be truly effective, it must often be brutal.

While there are no simple solutions to our current inflationary challenges, it’s clear we need a holistic approach. U.S. President Biden’s recent strategy provides one promising alternative. His goal is to tackle inflation by pressing companies to reduce costs, rather than wages, and by making prescription drugs, energy and childcare more affordable.

So the next time a politician tries to sell you on a quack monetarist remedy for our current inflationary woes, ask them if they’re willing to make us all pay the costs of another historic economic blunder.

This blog was first published on The Conversation on April 13, 2022.

Banking, Canada, Economics, Finance

The Bank of Canada must seize the pandemic’s historic moment and embrace innovation

Jacqueline Best

Peter Dietsch & Jacqueline Best

The Bank of Canada, like central banks around the world, is currently facing enormous upheaval and uncertainty due to the enduring COVID-19 pandemic.

Will its leadership seize the moment as an opportunity to innovate and respond to the challenges ahead, including rising inequality and climate change? Or will it treat the present crisis as a temporary exception, hoping to return to business as usual once the pandemic recedes?

This spring, the bank released the results of its consultations with Canadians as part of its current mandate review. This is a historic opportunity for our central bank and the federal government to make the bank work better for the Canadian people.

As academics specializing respectively in philosophy and economics, and politics, we’d like to highlight two key themes that emerged in the Bank of Canada’s consultations with Canadians.

Wealth inequality, climate action

First, many Canadians are deeply concerned about the increasingly unequal distribution of wealth in this country — particularly by the way it has been driven by skyrocketing house prices. Second, some Canadians would like to see the Bank of Canada take the threat of climate change seriously as it plays its key role in ensuring price and financial stability.

How could the bank do better in tackling these two core problems — the scourge of rising inequality and the future shocks of climate change?

On inequality, there are many useful models around the world. Although Canadians like to think that we’re more progressive than our neighbour to the south, the United States is actually well ahead in rethinking the role of their central bank. Its recent shift towards what’s known as average inflation targeting, a strategy that seeks to balance inflation and growth over the medium term, gives it more flexibility to promote employment.

Such a strategy, potentially combined with a dual mandate of price stability and employment, would allow the Bank of Canada to pay more attention to the needs of all Canadians. The bank’s consultations with Canadians suggest that there is in fact considerable support for such a move.

While this would be a first and important step in modernizing the central bank’s mandate, we need to go further and take a more careful look at some of the unconventional policy tools that the central bank has been using in the last year.

Quantitative easing

Since the COVID-19 crisis took hold, the Bank of Canada joined other central banks in engaging in what’s called quantitative easing, initiating massive purchases of financial assets. As a result, its balance sheet has increased by close to 500 per cent since March 2020.

Such liquidity injections by central banks are clearly necessary. The question is how this liquidity should be injected.

Suppose your doctor prescribes you a drug that is known to have serious side effects. Wouldn’t you want her to look into alternative treatments? The experience with quantitative easing since 2008 shows that it has two serious side effects, both of which speak to some of the core concerns of Canadians.

First, it exacerbates inequality. While the central bank may want to see a good portion of the injected liquidity used to stimulate real economic activity, this is not something it can control. Instead, a lot of the liquidity has ended up in stock markets and housing markets, benefiting wealthy asset owners and helping to push the cost of owning a house beyond the means of many Canadians.

As Mark Carney, then governor of the Bank of England, acknowledged in 2014, “the distributional consequences of the response to the financial crisis have been significant.” The same is true today.

Second, when quantitative easing includes buying corporate bonds, it facilitates access to capital markets for the firms in question. Central banks appeal to the idea of “market neutrality” and claim that an asset purchase that reflects current bond volumes on capital markets does not favour anyone in particular. But in countries like Canada, when you buy a basket of corporate bonds proportional to the outstanding bonds on the market, you inevitably reinforce the status quo with its many companies that have large carbon footprints. That inevitably slows the transition to a more sustainable economy.

Politics comes with the territory

Some will caution that independent central banks should not get involved with such deeply political issues. The answer to this is simply: It’s too late for that. Political decisions come with the territory of central banking today, and we better develop innovative policy instruments to reflect this reality.

Other central banks are adapting already. In December, the Swiss National Bank announced that its asset purchases will exclude all companies primarily active in coal mining.

Perhaps more significantly, since Christine Lagarde has taken over as president of the European Central Bank, the institution has vowed to take a more active stance on climate change.

Unconventional policies can also be used to alleviate — instead of exacerbating — inequality. One idea is to transfer money to citizens through so-called helicopter money, rather than rely on institutional investors to translate quantitative easing measures into economic stimulus. The policy response to COVID-19 actually provides an interesting blueprint for this.

The overall tone of the Bank of Canada’s consultations report seems to suggest that the bank is more comfortable with the status quo than with serious innovation. Although this may sound very Canadian, our central bank actually has a history of being an innovator in monetary policy. It was among the first central banks to adopt monetarism in 1975, and the second to adopt inflation targeting in 1991 when it was still an untested approach. To confront today’s many challenges, the Bank of Canada needs to rediscover that innovative zeal.

This blog was originally published on The Conversation, May 4, 2021.

Finance, Inflation

Don’t panic! (at least not about inflation)

Jacqueline Best

As financial markets have been showing their panicky side in the last few weeks, we’ve been hearing various accounts of what’s driving the volatility. One of the key narratives goes something like this: 1) wages are moving up in the United States, and 2) inflation is starting to increase, which could well 3) produce a spike in inflation as was seen in the 1970s, which means that it’s likely that 4) central banks will start have to raise interest rates more quickly, potentially slowing the economy; ergo: 5) the sky is falling!

Although there are some reasons to be anxious (particularly if you’ve been betting on low stock market volatility or are having a hard time making your mortgage payments), the underlying narrative about the inevitability of a return to high inflation levels is highly suspect.

So, before we all start stocking up on gold and canned goods, let’s take a more careful look at each piece of this logic.

Yes – wages are finally starting to move up in the US, after almost a decade of stagnation. In January, US wages rose at a faster rate than they have since the recession, while the Federal Reserve predicts that inflation will continue to move up this year towards their goal. This is welcome news, given that the long recovery from the 2008 global financial crisis has not translated until now into reasonable wage gains.

In Canada, where I live and work, the story is more complicated: unemployment is lower than it has been since 1976, and inflation is moving slowly upwards towards the Bank of Canada’s 2% target, but wage pressures remain modest.

And in the UK, even though the Bank of England signaled its move into hawkish territory in February with inflation currently above the 2% target, inflation has started to slow again and wage growth is still tepid.

Yet, while the first two parts of the inflation narrative hold true, at least in the US, the next leap of logic, which warns of a sudden takeoff in inflation like that seen in the 1970s, is far less persuasive.

For those who are either too young to remember this decade (or aren’t quite as fascinated as I am by this period in economic history) it’s worth explaining that the 1970s are a bogeyman for investors and central bankers. Between 1971 and 1980, the post-war monetary order of fixed change rates was dismantled, the US dollar was delinked from gold, there were two OPEC oil crises that more than quadrupled the price of oil, and inflation rates got close to 15% in the US and Canada, and topped out over 25% in the UK.

At the end of this decade-long crisis, the central bankers decided to give monetarism a go—trying to slow the expansion of the money supply and raising interest rates dramatically. In the US, Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker pushed the bank’s target rate close to 20%, while in Canada, mortgage rates went as high as 21%. Although the UK did push the bank rate up as high as 17% in 1979, Margaret Thatcher ultimately backed away from this particular strategy and turned to austerity as a way of squeezing inflation out of the economy through a painful recession.

While monetarism ultimately proved to be a failure, and there is still a great deal of debate about what caused and ultimately solved the 1970s’ “Great Inflation,” this traumatic experience paved the way to the current “new monetary consensus” in inflation-management policy, with its unwavering faith in central bank independence and very low inflation targets. Now, any sign that low inflationary expectations are becoming unanchored (i.e. people are receiving more reasonable wage increases), can produce panic.

Of course, no one wants to go back to the 1970s (and not only because of the dodgy haircuts). But how real is the risk that we might end up repeating history?

There several good reasons why we should be skeptical of such leaps in logic.

For one thing, inflation not only depends on people’s expectations of where prices are headed, but also depends on their ability to act on these expectations—by, for example, demanding wage increases. In the 1970s, workers had considerable power to make those demands, with roughly twice as many unionized in the UK and the US than today. As the recent recovery from the 2008 crisis has made very clear, employers now have far more power in determining wages than workers.

It is also worth remembering that the 1970s experience of high inflation was linked to a series of massive shocks—most notably the OPEC crises.

If we aren’t likely to see a return to the inflationary spikes of the 1970s, then what should we be looking for central bankers to do today? Should they double down on inflation targets as many hawks have suggested and move aggressively to pre-empt any jumps in inflation?

The short answer is no.

Just because inflation is finally moving towards the target after nearly a decade of trying to get it there doesn’t mean that inflation targets actually make sense—particularly the extremely low targets that have recently become the orthodoxy.

As I have argued in a Foreign Affairs article, making very low interest rates the only goal of monetary policy has considerable political costs—costs that become very apparent when even the most modest of wage increases for hard-working families becomes a sign that we need another round of monetary austerity.

Yet that doesn’t mean that we are quite out of the economic woods.

Although inflation isn’t likely to skyrocket, even a modest increase will tend to lead to higher interest rates, which will reduce the easy credit that has been making stock markets so bubbly of late. Since stock markets are prone to panics as well as manias, it’s likely to be a rough ride for some time.

A modest rise in interest rates will still pose some very real risks for those economies (like Canada’s) with significant household debt.

With interest rates still extremely low and government debt levels already high, we have fewer tools for coping with the next major bump in the economic road.

And, of course, Donald Trump is still the President of the United States and Brexit remains a source of seemingly boundless economic uncertainty.

So, feel free to panic—just not about inflation.

This blog was originally posted, in a slightly different form, on the CIPS Blog and on SPERI.comment.

Banking, Economics, Exception, Finance, Political economy, Risk, Uncertainty

Central banks are facing a credibility trap

Jacqueline Best

Quite a few commentators have noted that central bankers have become rather less boring of late. Since the 2008 financial crisis, central banks have taken on new roles and responsibilities. They have experimented with a whole range of unconventional monetary policies. And, in the process, they have gained considerably in power and influence.

There has been less attention to a key paradox underlying central bankers’ new roles on the world stage: they are being forced to govern through exceptions in an era in which rule-following (particularly the holy grail of the 2% inflation target) has become the ultimate source of policy credibility. Where central bankers are supposed to stick to the rules, they have found themselves endlessly making exceptions, promising that one day things will return to normal.

This paradox poses real challenges for efforts to foster a sustained global economic recovery. Governing through exceptional policies is always a politically-fraught undertaking, particularly over the long-term, but it is even more difficult in a context in which the dominant convention is one of strict rule-following.

Since the early experiments with monetarism in the late 1970s and early 1980s, most central banks have moved towards an increasingly rule-based approach to monetary policy, with inflation targeting becoming the norm in many countries in recent years.

Yet today we are faced with a situation in which the rules no longer apply but are still being invoked as if they did.

A recent Buttonwood column notes that the Bank of England has missed its inflation target “almost exactly half the time” since 2008. The European Central Bank (ECB) has effectively expanded its narrow mandate, which formally requires it to make price stability its top priority, by arguing that employment and other issues are crucial to achieving it. Yet the ECB and the Bank of England continue to act as if the old rules still apply.

If we look beyond the narrow rules that are supposed to be governing central bank actions and examine the wider changes in their recent policies, we find similar patterns. Scratch an unconventional monetary policy and you will find a kind of economic exceptionalism: an argument that the crisis that we face is extreme enough that it requires a radical but temporary suspension of economic rules and norms.

Most of the unconventional monetary policies that have been tried to date, and just about all of those that have been proposed as future possibilities if we face a renewed global recession, break quite radically with existing norms. Negative interest rates weren’t even supposed to be economically possible (until they were tried), while quantitative easing (a central bank’s buying up bonds by massively increasing the size of its balance sheet) still carries a whiff of irresponsibility linked to its past as a way for governments to avoid fiscal retrenchment by “printing money.”

More recent proposals include helicoptering money into the government’s or the public’s accounts, abolishing cash to make low interest rates effective, and even introducing a reverse incomes policy—a government-enforced increase in wages (as opposed to the wage controls of the 1970s) to try to get inflation going.

All of these existing and potential policies break with current economic norms, and all are being pitched as temporary, exceptional measures that are (or may be) necessary in the face of an extreme crisis.

Ironically, rule-following was designed precisely to avoid this problem. It came into its own as an influential approach to monetary policy in the wake of the destabilizing 1970s, with their stop-go economic policies and rampant inflation. Mainstream economists came to love rule-based monetary policy as did politicians—not just neoconservatives like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan who first championed the approach, but eventually the more centrist politicians who followed like Tony Blair and Bill Clinton, as well as today’s mixed lot.

A rule-governed approach to policy was designed to be both politically and economically stabilizing—to do away with the problem and even the possibility of exceptions by removing not only governments’ but even central bankers’ discretion: just stick to the rule, and everything will work out. A tidy, efficient, depoliticized (although certainly not apolitical) approach to monetary policy.

Yet rules only seem great until they don’t apply anymore. A rule that pretends it can always apply (or at least, as Colin Hay puts it in his introductory blog, in the 99.9% of times that seem relevant) inevitably runs serious problems when an exception becomes necessary.

Of course, as Alan Greenspan has noted, the victory of rules over discretion was never entirely true in practice. But it was an extremely powerful narrative—one that promised that central banks’ (and governments’) commitments to low inflation and economic stability was credible because they were constrained to follow the rules.

It was also a very effective narrative that has convinced markets that anything other that rule-following is likely to be destabilizing. As central banks begin to face the limits of those rules, their earlier persuasiveness has come back to haunt them: a recent paper from some Federal Reserve staff notes that although a higher inflation target would make sense in the United States, increasing it could well backfire if market actors believed that it would be too inflationary.

This fixation on rule-following has thus put central bankers into a credibility trap. If bankers admit that the rules no longer apply, then they risk losing their credibility as market actors have come to believe the mantra that rules—particularly low inflation targets—are the only way to ensure sound monetary policy. On the other hand if they don’t admit the limits of the rules, and continue lurching from exception to exception, they will eventually lose credibility as the gap between rhetoric and reality widens.

Central banks are damned if they do admit the limits of rules and damned if they don’t.

Of course, the most viable solution to this trap is for governments to stop relying so heavily on central banks in the first place and start taking some responsibility for economic recovery through concerted fiscal action (something that the Canadian government has at least started to do). Yet for that kind of fiscal action to work, governments have to convince the markets that they believe in it enough to stick to their guns and follow through—a rather unlikely scenario in today’s austerity-driven times.

As the potential for renewed economic crisis continues to grow, this credibility gap will only widen—as central bankers and governments find themselves lurching from exception to exception, refusing to question the neoliberal rules that no longer seem to apply.

This blog was first posted on the Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute’s website.

Banking, Canada, Finance, International development, Risk, Uncertainty

Canada needs to do a better job of managing financial uncertainty

Jacqueline Best

Published in the Hill Times, May 25, 2015

As Canadians, we pride ourselves on how well our financial regulations coped with the 2008 financial crisis. Given this attitude, it’s not surprising that Canadian policymakers have avoided a major overhaul to our regulations in response.

Yet we need to make sure that this pride in our system does not lead to complacency. Rather than just looking backwards to how the Canadian financial system performed in the last crisis, we also need to look forwards and recognize how much the global economy is changing.

Those changes take two key forms. First, the economy has become much more uncertain since the crisis. And second, a number of other countries have raised the bar for financial regulation. If Canadians don’t catch up with these two major shifts, we may well find ourselves in trouble.

Whether we look at the International Monetary Fund’s latest Global Financial Stability Report, or the Bank of Canada’s recent Financial System Review, it is clear that both the global and national economies have become increasingly uncertain. That uncertainty defines some of the most important aspects of our economy, whether we look at the likely medium-term impact of the decline in oil prices, the potential for a hard landing in an overheated housing market, or the possibility that Canadians will wake up one day and realize that their household debt level is unsustainable.

This environment of profound uncertainty poses serious policy challenges.

In the good old days of the so-called “Great Moderation” from the mid-1980s to the financial crisis, policymakers were able to focus on what Donald Rumsfeld famously described as “known unknowns”—the kinds of risks to which policymakers could assign definite probabilities. Today, we are faced instead with a great deal of “unknown unknowns”—the kinds of uncertainty that resists formal modeling, as Bank of Canada Governor, Stephen Poloz noted in a recent paper.

How should we regulate financial markets in the face of this kind of uncertainty? Very carefully. As it becomes increasingly difficult to predict what kinds of complex risks the economy might face, we need to err on the side of caution.

As good Canadians we might assume that we already have some of the most cautious financial regulations around. Yet this is no longer the case.

Yes, Canada has implemented the capital adequacy standards set out in the Basel III accord very quickly. Yet our government has treated those requirements as the gold standard, when they were designed to be a bare minimum. On the other hand, the United Kingdom and the United States are in the process of implementing more demanding standards, including adopting higher and stricter leverage ratios. While Canada was one of the only countries with a leverage ratio requirement before the crisis, we now starting to look relatively lax.

Even more striking is the fact that Canada, unlike every other major country, has no central body responsible for coordinating efforts to manage systemic risk. The Canadian regulatory universe is fragmented, with important pieces of the regulatory puzzle managed by half a dozen agencies plus a multitude of provincial authorities. The Bank of Canada does an admirable job of identifying potential sources of systemic risk, but they have few tools for acting on them.

Canadian authorities have engaged in macroprudential regulation in recent years—most notably through their efforts to cool the housing market down. Yet, as a recent IMF report points out, those efforts have unintentionally encouraged those who no longer qualify for prime mortgages into the under-regulated world of “shadow lending,” potentially increasing systemic risk. In order to manage an uncertain economy, someone needs to be able to look at the system as a whole: to connect the dots that link regulations governing consumer credit, mortgages, interest rates, big, small and “shadow” banking institutions.

What about the usual financial sector response that more regulation will cost Canadian financial institutions, and thus the economy, more generally? We should have learned by now that the cost of another crisis would be much greater still. Given the triple threat of uncertain oil prices, a volatile housing market and rising consumer debt, another crisis would likely hit us harder than the last one. It’s worth being well prepared for that kind of risk.

Posted on the CIPS Blog June 5, 2015. 

Canada, Finance, Measurement, Political economy, Results, Risk, Uncertainty

Why we need to take economic uncertainty seriously

Jacqueline Best

If you have been reading the financial press over the past week, you know that the global economy’s chances are looking a lot more uncertain these days. What you may not know, however, is that this more recent upswing in uncertainty and volatility is part of a much broader pattern in the global economy—one that poses some real challenges for how policymakers do their job.

Stephen Poloz, the Governor of the Bank of Canada, just released a working paper in which he suggests that the economic climate has become so profoundly uncertain since the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 that it resists formal modeling.

Because of this, the Bank will no longer engage in the policy of ‘forward guidance’, in which it provides markets with a clear long-term commitment to its current very low interest rate policy. The Bank is changing this policy not because it is any less committed to low interest rates in the medium term, but because it does not want to give the markets a false sense of security about the predictability of the future. Instead, Poloz suggests that policymakers should do a better job of communicating the uncertainties facing the economy and the Bank itself as it formulates its policies.

Why should we care about this seemingly minor change in the Bank of Canada’s policy? Because it underlines just how much our governance practices are going to have to change in order to cope with the increasing uncertainty of the current economic and political dynamics.

It’s ironic that this warning is coming from the Bank of Canada. Central banks do not like change. They are just about the most conservative government institutions around.

Since the late 1970s, central bankers have been wedded to the idea that the most straightforward monetary policies are the best—ideally taking the form of a simple rule that can be expressed as a quantitative target, like the Bank of Canada’s inflation target. Economists argue that such policy rules are stabilizing because they avoid giving too much discretion to central bankers, thus reducing uncertainty about the Bank’s plans and increasing the credibility of their commitment to low inflation.

Yet these simple rules are effective only as long as the models that they are based on can accurately capture an economy’s dynamics and needs. If the economy is too complex and uncertain for such straightforward forms of quantification, then simple rules are at best misleading, and at worst destabilizing.

Poloz’s recent paper suggests that he recognizes some of these dilemmas—and the importance of coming to terms with them quickly in the current period of economic volatility.

The Bank of Canada’s Governor is not alone in recognizing these uncertainties. Janet Yellen, the current Chair of the United States Federal Reserve Board, has also pointed to the limits of simple rules in guiding central bank policy in the current context. Her predecessor, Ben Bernanke, referenced Donald Rumsfeld’s concept of ‘unknown unknowns’ to describe the extreme uncertainty that faced market participants during the recent financial crisis.

Yet, with this paper, Poloz seems to go further than his American counterparts in recognizing the implications of these unknown unknowns. In the same speech cited above, Bernanke argued that the failures of the global financial crisis were failures of engineering and management, and not of the underlying science of economics.

Poloz, by contrast, describes the work of monetary policymaking as a “craft” (not a science), and suggests that it is too complex to be treated as a form of engineering. The uncertainty that we are dealing with today, he suggests, “simply does not lend itself as easily to either mathematical or empirical analysis, or any real sort of formalization.”

This is a remarkable departure from the kind of numbers-driven rhetoric that we have heard from the Harper government in recent years.

The Canadian government has been increasingly preoccupied with measuring results, in health care, international development, and across government-funded programs. Last May, when announcing additional funds for the health of mothers and children in developing countries, Stephen Harper argued, “You can’t manage what you can’t measure.

Poloz’s paper suggests that, on the contrary, because of the sheer complexity and uncertainty of the current global order, we have no alternative but to find ways of managing what we can’t measure. As I argue in my recent book, rather than using ever-more dubious indicators and targets to drive policy on everything from health to the economy, we need to find better ways of assessing, communicating and managing the true complexity of the policy challenges that we face.

This will not be an easy task, either technically or politically. It will take time to educate a public—not to mention a market—that has become used to simplified pronouncements.

The less we can rely on objective measurements and simple rules, the more careful we have to be about ensuring democratic accountability for policy decisions—through the political process and through an informed and active media.

And perhaps the biggest challenge that this new reality presents is the need for our politicians to heed Poloz’s suggestion that they not only recognize the inescapability of “uncertainty, and the policy errors it can foster,” but that they wear them “like an ill-fitting suit . . . that is, with humility.”

Humility tends to be in scarce supply in political circles these days. That too will need to change if we’re going to develop the kinds of creative policy tools that we need to manage the uncertain times to come.

First posted on the CIPS Blog.